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Identifying the most influential spreaders is an important issue in understanding and controlling spreading
processes on complex networks. Recent studies showed that nodes located in the core of a network as identified
by the k-shell decomposition are the most influential spreaders. However, through a great deal of numerical
simulations, we observe that not in all real networks do nodes in high shells are very influential: in some
networks the core nodes are the most influential which we call true core, while in others nodes in high shells,
even the innermost core, are not good spreaders which we call core-like group. By analyzing the k-core structure
of the networks, we find that the true core of a network links diversely to the shells of the network, while the
core-like group links very locally within the group. For nodes in the core-like group, the k-shell index cannot
reflect their location importance in the network. We further introduce a measure based on the link diversity of
shells to effectively distinguish the true core and core-like group, and identify core-like groups throughout the
networks. Our findings help to better understand the structural features of real networks and influential nodes.
The most influential nodes can maximize the speed and scope of information spreading compared with other nodes in a
network [1]. Locating these influential nodes is important in improving the use of available resources [2] and controlling the
spread of information [3]. A critical issue is how to determine and distinguish the spreading capability of a node. Centrality
is usually used to measure the relative importance of nodes within the network, such as degree centrality [4], betweenness
centrality [5], closeness centrality [6], eigenvector centrality [7], PageRank centrality [8] and its variance [9]. Nodes with high
centrality are considered more influential in the spreading process [10–14]. Among these measures, degree centrality is a simple
and effective way, although it is based only on local link information [15, 16]. The merit of degree is challenged by a recent
study [12], in which the authors pointed out that the most influential spreaders do not correspond to the nodes with largest degree,
but are those located in the core of the network as identified by the k-shell decomposition [17]. This means the higher coreness
of a node, the more influential it is in the spreading dynamics.
The k-shell decomposition decomposes a network into hierarchically ordered shells by recursively pruning the nodes with
degree less than current shell index (see Methods for details ). This procedure assigns each node with an index kS , representing
its coreness in the network. A large kS value means a core position in the network, while a small kS value defines the periphery
of the network [12]. Because of a low computational complexity of O(N + E) [18], where N is the network size and E is
the number of edges in the network, this method is extensively used for large-scale network analysis. Generally speaking, it
is used to efficiently visualize the structure of large-scale networks [19, 20], analyze the core structure of networks [21–25],
and capture the essential structural properties of real networks [26]. Since the publication of Ref. [12], the coreness is widely
used to quantify the importance of a node in a spreading process [27–29]. For example, in a economic crisis network, nodes
with the highest coreness are most likely to spread a crisis globally [30], while in a rumor spreading, nodes with high coreness
act as firewalls to prevent the diffusion of a rumor to the whole system [31]. Even nodes with low coreness are considered as
bridge elements, which can effectively control the disease in small world networks through an acquaintance-based vaccination
strategy [32]. Many works extended the k-shell decomposition method, either modify it for a better ranking [33–37] or generalize
it to weighted networks [38, 39], dynamical networks [40] and multiplex networks [41].
In all these studies, the k-shell decomposition is used as a powerful tool to analyze the network structure and identify important
nodes. Despite its effectiveness, researchers have noticed that the k-shell method has some defects [28, 42]. For example, when
there is a lack of the complete network structure, one can not apply the k-shell decomposition to the network. In tree structure
and BA model network, the capability of finding influential spreaders is limited due to the low resolution of kS index. Here, from
the perspective of spreading efficiency of cores that have been identified by the k-shell decomposition, we study on whether in
different real networks do the core nodes have a higher spreading influence than other nodes. In a common belief, it is. But
through intensive computer simulations, we find that it is not the case. In some networks core nodes have the largest spreading
efficiency, while in others core nodes have relatively low spreading efficiency. What is the reason for the obvious distinct
results? No work has focused on this question to our knowledge. In Refs. [12, 37], the authors pointed out that the performance
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2of centrality measure relates somehow to the infection probability when evaluating the spreading capability of nodes. We find
that although the infection probability will cause some fluctuations, the specific structure of real networks is the origin of the
distinct performance of coreness in predicting spreading efficiency: in the first case, the core of a network has a link diversity
to other shells of the network, while in the latter case the core is linked very locally. We respectively call them true core and
core-like group. Then, we propose a measure of information entropy to locate core-like groups in real networks. These findings
will help us in understanding the real network structures.
Results
We first calculate the imprecision of coreness and degree in identifying influential spreaders and discover the true core and
core-like group in real networks. We then analyze the structural features of the true core and core-like group and uncover their
difference. Finally we successfully locate the core-like groups throughout the network by defining a measure of link entropy.
Calculating the imprecision function of coreness and degree in the SIR spreading process. We use a classic Susceptible-
Infected-Recovered (SIR) spreading model to simulate the spreading process [43, 44], and record the spreading capability (or
spreading efficiency) of each node, which is defined as the average size of infected population M for each node as spreading
origin (see Methods for details). To evaluate whether the structural centrality of coreness is an effective index to measure
the spreading capability of nodes compared with degree, we calculate the imprecision function ǫkS (p) and ǫk(p) proposed in
Ref. [12]. The imprecision function is defined as
εkS(k)(p) = 1−
MkS(k)(p)
Meff (p)
, (1)
where p is the fraction of network size N (p ∈ [0, 1]), MkS(k)(p) and Meff (p) are the average spreading efficiencies of pN
nodes with highest coreness kS (degree k) values and largest spreading efficiency, respectively. This function quantifies how
close to the optimal spreading is the average spreading of the pN nodes with largest kS (k) values. The smaller the εkS(k) value,
the more accurate the kS(k) index is a measure to identify the most influential spreaders.
The imprecision functions of nine real networks are shown in Fig. 1. Contrary to common belief, the coreness ks does
not perform consistently well in all networks. We divide them into three groups. In Router, Emailcontact and AS networks,
the kS imprecision is lower than the k based method. In Fig. 1 (a)-(c), the imprecision ǫkS(p) is very low, under 0.06 in the
demonstrated range of 0.003 6 p 6 0.029, and is much lower than ǫk(p). This means the coreness predicts the outcome of
spreading more reliably than degree. However, the imprecision ǫkS (p) for the next three networks (i.e., Email, CA-Hep and
Hamster) is much higher than the imprecision ǫk(p). In Fig. 1 (d)-(f), the values of ǫkS (p) is above 0.2 for all the three networks,
and is much higher than ǫk(p). This is completely contrary to the case of the first three networks. As for the last three networks
of PGP, Netsci and Astro networks, things are more complicated shown in Fig. 1 (g)-(i). In PGP, the kS method acts better than
k when p < 0.015. Then there is a sudden rise in ǫkS (p) and it becomes higher than the imprecision of degree. In Netsci, when
p ≤ 0.026, the imprecision of kS is much lower than that of k. There is a fast rise of the ǫkS (p) at p = 0.027, and at p = 0.05 the
kS imprecision exceeds k imprecision (see Fig. S1 in Supporting Information (SI) for large p plots). In Astro, the sudden rise of
kS imprecision occurs at p = 0.015 and the value of ǫkS (p) goes up to around 0.18. This indicates a complex performance of
coreness as a measure of spreading efficiency.
Discovering true core and core-like group in real networks. To find out the reason for the distinct performance of coreness
in predicting spreading efficiency is the origin of our research interest in this paper. In the following, we first explore the
structural characteristics of the first two groups of networks, and then explain the performance of coreness in the last three
networks. As we know, the k-shell decomposition tends to assign many nodes with identical kS value, although their spreading
capabilities may be different. When we calculate the imprecision function at a certain p, nodes with the same kS value are
chosen randomly. This will cause some fluctuation in the kS imprecision curve (fraction of nodes in high shells is shown in the
SI table S1). Given this fluctuation, we change to calculate
εkS (kS) = 1−
MkS (kS)
Meff (kS)
, (2)
whereMkS (kS) is the average spreading efficiency of the nodes with coreness k′S ≥ kS (nodes in kS-core), and Meff (kS) is the
average spreading efficiency of n nodes with highest spreading efficiency, where n equals to the number of nodes with coreness
k′S ≥ kS . To compare with k performance, we have
εk(kS) = 1−
Mk(kS)
Meff (kS)
, (3)
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FIG. 1. The imprecision of kS and k as a function of p for nine real networks. The kS imprecision (black squares) and k
imprecision (red circles) are compared in each network. p is the proportion of nodes calculated, ranging from 0.003 to 0.029.
See Fig.S1 for large p plots in SI.
where Mk(kS) is the average spreading efficiency of n nodes with highest degree, and n is as above. The imprecision of kS is
supposed to be low if the nodes in high shells are efficient spreaders. The results are shown in Fig. 2. In the first three networks
(a)-(c), the εkS (kS) is very low and much lower than the imprecision of degree εk(kS) for large kS , which means most of nodes
in high shells (shells with large kS value) are efficient spreaders. In the next three networks (d)-(f), the εkS (kS) is much higher
than the εk(kS) for the innermost core (the shell with the maximum kS value), and the absolute value is even greater than 0.4,
which means many nodes in the innermost core are not influential spreaders. From the perspective of dynamic spreading, we
call the innermost core of the first three networks a true core, and presumably call that of the other three networks a false core,
or core-like group. This poor kS performance is obviously different from the fluctuation of imprecision caused by the resolution
of kS index we mentioned above.
Exploring the cause of poor coreness imprecision from structural features. In order to find out the reason for the poor
performances of coreness in the spreading process, we first look into the structural properties of the studied real networks. The
features of the studied real networks are listed in Table I. From Table I, we see that the degree heterogeneity Hk of the first
group is sufficiently larger than that of the second group. The degree heterogeneity is defined as Hk = 〈k2〉/〈k〉2 that evaluates
the heterogeneity of degree sequence of a network, where 〈k2〉 and 〈k〉 are the second moment and first moment of degree
respectively. In addition, the degree assortativity r of the first group is negative, which implies that nodes of large degrees are
inclined to connecting to nodes of small degrees. As nodes in high shells always have large degrees and nodes in low shells
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FIG. 2. The imprecision of kS and k as a function of kS for six real networks. The kS imprecision (black squares) and k
imprecision (red circles) are compared in each network. Each square represents the kS imprecision of nodes in kS-core, and
each circle represents the k imprecision of n highest degree nodes, where n equals to the number of nodes in kS-core. kS is an
integer representing the shell index, ranging from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
(shells with small kS value) have small degrees, negative assortativity implies a good connection between high shell nodes and
low shell nodes. On the contrary, the assortativity of the second group is positive or close to zero, which implies nodes of large
degrees are inclined to connect to each other or connect randomly.
TABLE I. Properties of the real networks studied in this work. Structural properties include number of nodes (N ), number
of edges (E), average degree (〈k〉), maximum degree (kmax), degree heterogeneity (Hk), degree assortativity (r), clustering
coefficient (C), maximum kS index (kSmax), epidemic threshold (λc), infection probability in the SIR spreading in the main
text (λ).
Network N E 〈k〉 kmax Hk r C kSmax λc λ
Router 5022 6258 2.5 106 5.503 -0.138 0.012 7 0.08 0.27
Emailcontact 12625 20362 3.2 576 34.249 -0.387 0.109 23 0.01 0.10
AS 22963 48436 4.2 2390 61.978 -0.198 0.230 25 0.004 0.13
Email 1133 5451 9.6 71 1.942 0.078 0.220 11 0.06 0.08
CA-Hep 8638 24806 5.7 65 2.261 0.239 0.482 31 0.08 0.12
Hamster 2000 16097 16.1 273 2.719 0.023 0.540 24 0.02 0.04
PGP 10680 24340 4.6 206 4.153 0.240 0.266 31 0.06 0.19
Netsci 379 914 4.8 34 1.663 -0.082 0.741 8 0.14 0.30
Astro 14845 119652 16.1 360 2.820 0.228 0.670 56 0.02 0.05
To evaluate whether the difference of Hk and r between the two groups of networks results in the distinct performance of
kS imprecision, we randomize the networks using two rewiring schemes (see Methods for details). In the first one, degrees
of nodes are preserved after each single rewiring but correlations between the degrees of connected nodes are destroyed [45].
This keeps the Hk unchanged with the original real networks while other structural features destroyed. As is shown in Fig. S2
5in SI, the coreness performance is greatly improved: the kS imprecision is very low and basically lower than or close to the k
imprecision in degree-preserving randomized networks. This indicates that the relatively small Hk value of the second group
of networks is not the reason of poor kS imprecision. Next, in the second scheme the rewiring preserves both the degrees of
nodes and the joint degree-degree distribution of connected nodes, P (k, k′), so that the degree-degree correlations of all nodes
are preserved. This keeps both Hk and r unchanged as the original real networks, but as shown in Fig. S3, the kS imprecision is
very low and in general lower than the k imprecision. This implies that the small Hk value and positive r are not the cause of
poor kS imprecision in the second groups of networks. So, what is the real origin of the poor coreness performance?
Analyzing the connectivity between shells. We move to explore the complex connectivity between shells of the studied real
networks. Specifically, we consider the link patterns from each shell to its upper shells (shells with greater kS index), equal shell
(the shell with equal kS index) and lower shells (shells with smaller kS index). We define the link strength of node i to its upper
shells by the proportion function
rui =
eui
ki
, (4)
where eui is the number of links originating from node i to nodes in upper shells , ki is the total number of links of node i, that is
the degree of node i. Large rui indicates more links to the upper shells. Similarly, the link strengths of node i to its equal shells
and lower shells are quantified by rei = eei /ki, rli = eli/ki respectively. The link strengths of kS-shell to its upper (equal, lower)
shells are the average link strength of nodes in that shell, that is
R
u(e,l)
kS
=
∑
i∈ΓkS
r
u(e,l)
i
nkS
, (5)
where ΓkS consists of nodes with coreness kS , nkS is the number of nodes in kS-shell, and RukS +R
e
kS
+RlkS = 1.
From Fig. 3 (a)-(c) for the first group of networks, RukS generally decreases with kS , this is because the number of nodes in
upper shells decreases monotonously with the increase of kS . RekS remains stable with the increase of kS . R
l
kS
increases with
kS , and in the innermost core, this value goes up to 0.6 and above. For large kS , RlkS is much greater than R
e
kS
, which means
a large proportion of links of high shells point to the their lower shells, obviously higher than the proportion of links within the
shell. In Fig. 3 (d)-(f) for the second group, RukS decreases with kS in Email and CA-Hep, although there is some fluctuation in
Hamster. RekS increases with kS . In the innermost core, R
e
kS
is close to 0.7 in Email, close to 1.0 in CA-Hep, and close to 0.8 in
Hamster, which is at least 50% larger than that of the first group. RlkS increases with kS at first and falls suddenly at some high
shells. For these three networks, RlkS are under 0.4 in the innermost core, and is much lower than R
e
kS
. This indicates that in the
second group, the proportion of links from high shells pointing to lower shells is obviously lower than the proportion of links
pointing within the shell. This is a sign of densely connected small group within the shell. The average clustering coefficient of
nodes in high shells also reflects the overly dense connection in high shells in the second group (See Fig. S4 in SI). We plot the
link strength of each shell to its lower shells, equal shell and upper shells in the degree-degree correlation preserving randomized
networks in Fig. S5. RlkS is promoted above 0.35 and is greater than R
e
kS
in most high shells in CA-Hep and Hamster, although
in Email there is only a little promotion. The rewiring has changed the dense local link patterns of core-like groups, which is
reflect by the increase of RlkS and decrease of R
e
kS
in high shells. The promoted kS performance in Fig. S3 is the result of
enhanced link diversity.
Next, we focus on the link pattern of the innermost core. The link strength rksi = eksi /ki defines the ratio of links from a
innermost core node i to the shell with index kS to the degree of node i. RkSmax is the average link strength of nodes in the
innermost core to the shell with index kS . Fig. 4 (a) shows the link strength of innermost core to all shells in the first three
networks, which is a U-shape curve. In these networks, apart from the link ratio within the core, the largest link ratio points to
the shell with most nodes, usually the 1-shell. A U-shape distribution of links from the core is a good feature of core-periphery
structure, in which core nodes are well connected to other core nodes and to periphery nodes and periphery nodes are not well
connected to each other [46]. In the second group, shown in Fig. 4 (b), the link of innermost core to all shells is different from
the first group. Core nodes are very inclined to connecting to core nodes, with a link strength above 0.6. The second largest
link ratio points to the adjacent shell of the innermost core, other than the shell with most nodes. When an epidemic spreading
origins from core nodes, it is easy to spread throughout the core, but is relatively difficult to spread system wide. This locally
connected phenomenon also implies the origin of core-like group (i. e., false core): nodes are densely connected within a small
group which contributes much to the kS index of the nodes, but in the whole network these nodes are not best connected and not
located in the most important position for spreading. The link pattern of the second innermost shell is shown in Fig. S6 in SI.
Identifying core-like groups from a structural perspective. The above analysis suggests an obvious structural difference
between the two groups of networks: in the first one, the link pattern of innermost core to other shells exhibits a strong diversity,
while in the second group, the link of innermost core is very localized within the shell. To quantify the link diversity of a shell
61 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
 
 
 Rl
kS
 Re
kS
 Ru
kS
a Router
R
k S
 
 
Emailcontactb
 
 
ASc
 
 
d Email
 
 
e
CA-HepR
k S
kSkS
 
 
f Hamster
kS
FIG. 3. Link strength of shells for the real networks. The link strength of each shell to its lower shells RlkS (black squares),
equal shell RekS (red circles) and upper shells RukS (blue triangles) are represented. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the
largest kS value in the network.
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FIG. 4. Link strength of the innermost core to each shell of the network. (a) The link strength of the innermost core to each
shell exhibits a U-shape curve in Router (black squares), Emailcontact (red circles) and AS (blue triangles) networks. (b) The
link strength of the innermost core to each shell exhibit a slope in Email (black squares), CA-Hep (red circles) and Hamster
(blue triangles) networks. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
7with index kS , we define a link entropy as
HkS = −
1
lnL
kSmax∑
k′
S
=1
rkS ,k′S lnrkS ,k′S , (6)
where rkS ,k′S is the average link strength of kS-shell to the k
′
S-shell and L is the number of shells. The normalized factor lnL
measures the entropy when links are uniformly distributed in all shells. This normalization makes the networks with different
number of shells comparable. For the innermost core of each network, kS is set to the maximum kS value of the network.
Entropy of cores of the real network and its degree-preserving randomized version are shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5 (a), true cores
have a link entropy HkSmax higher than 0.6 while false cores have a link entropy lower than 0.5. But in the randomized network,
Fig. 5 (b), all the cores have a link entropy HkSmax higher than 0.6. Fig. S7 in SI shows the core entropy of degree-degree
preserving randomized networks, which is above 0.5 for all studied networks. High entropy corresponds to a more uniform
link pattern, where the core is well-connected to the other parts of the network. Low entropy corresponds to a localized link
pattern, where the core is densely connected within the shell. In fact, these false cores are not located in the central position of
the networks, reflecting by the relatively low spreading efficiency, e.g. the 11-shell in Email, 31-shell in CA-Hep and 24-shell in
Hamster, as shown in Figs. S9 and S10 in SI.
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FIG. 5. Link entropy of the innermost core for the real networks and their randomized version. (a) Link entropy of the
innermost core for the real networks. (b) Link entropy of the innermost core for the degree-preserving randomized networks.
kSmax is the largest kS value in the network. HkSmax is the link entropy of the innermost core.
Locating the position of core-like groups throughout the networks. Uncovering locally connected core-like groups leads
us to understand the imprecision of coreness centrality in the spreading process. We present the imprecision function of PGP,
Netsci and Astro networks in Fig. 6(a)-(c). The coreness performs very well at large kS values, but then rises suddenly at certain
shells. Specifically speaking, in PGP at the 22-shell and above, the imprecision of kS is lower than that of k. However, there
are sudden rises at the 21-shell, 16-shell and 15-shell. From the 10-shell, the kS imprecision is lower than k again. In Netsci,
the kS imprecision is very low at the 8-shell. Then it rises up at the 7-shell and 6-shell. The kS imprecision is worse than that
of k until the 4-shell. In Astro, the kS imprecision is low at the 51-shell and higher shells. Then it rises up at the 48-shell and
then falls. The same phenomenon occurs at the 30-shell. The rise of kS imprecision implies that the corresponding shells are
core-like groups. Locating them by a dynamic spreading method requires time-consuming simulations.
According to Eq. (6), we calculate the link entropy of each shell in these networks. The shells outlined by hollow red circles
in Fig. 6 (d)-(f) have relatively low entropy, which corresponds to locally connected core-like groups. This is reflected by the rise
in kS imprecision shown in Fig. 6 (a)-(c). The link patterns of the core-like groups, shown in Fig. S8, are similar to that of false
cores in the second group of Email, CA-Hep and Hamster: a dense connection within the shell. The only difference is that these
core-like groups locate in the outer shells of the network other than the innermost shell. These core-like groups have an obvious
low spreading efficiency than their adjacent shells, which is also confirmed in Fig. S9 and S10. From the above, we see the link
8entropy provides a fast way to locate the position of core-like groups in the network without running a large amount of spreading
simulations, which is very important in identifying key spreaders and controlling the spreading dynamics on networks.
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FIG. 6. Locating core-like groups in real networks by link entropy. (a)-(c) The imprecision of kS and k as a function of kS
for three real networks. The kS imprecision (black squares) and k imprecision (red circles) are compared. Link entropy of
shells in three networks. HkS is the link entropy of kS shell. Hollow red circles outline the shells which are densely connected
core-like groups. These are 21-shell, 16-shell and 15-shell in PGP, 7-shell and 6-shell in Netsci and 48-shell and 30-shell in
Astro. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
Discussion
Analyzing and profiling the structures of real networks is an important step in understanding and controlling dynamic behav-
iors on networks. The k-shell decomposition is a powerful tool to profile the hierarchical structures of networks. The inner core
corresponds to the shells of large kS and the network periphery corresponds to the shells of small kS . This makes kS index an
effective centrality measure to distinguish the spreading capability of nodes, which is validated in many real networks. However,
there are circumstances where the k-shell decomposition is not able to identify influential spreaders, which leaves much space to
explore. Here from the perspective of core’s spreading efficiency, we discover that in some real networks, there exist core-like
groups, which have high coreness but are in fact not located in the core of the network. By analyzing the k-core structure of real
networks, we discover the distinct link patterns of true cores and core-like groups. For the true core of a network, it displays
strong link diversity to other shells of the network, represented by a U-shape link curve. As for the core-like group, it has a very
dense and local internal connection, represented as a slope-shape link curve. Based on the link pattern, we define a measure of
link entropy to evaluate the link diversity of a shell to the remaining shells of the network. This provides a fast way to locate the
core-like groups throughout the network from a structural perspective, which have a relatively low link entropy. We note that in
Ref. [29] the authors calculated the entropy of each node to assess the heterogeneity of links. They use k-shell decomposition
to assign each node a global feature and compute for each node an entropy as its global diversity, which is then combined with
local feature to rank node influence. However, this entropy relates much to the degree of a node. A node with small degree has a
limited number of layers it can connect to, even the connection is uniformly distributed. The node entropy is limited in the sense
of statistics. Contrary to their work, we target to a group. We consider the link diversity of a shell, which consists of several
nodes and these nodes have different degrees. By using the entropy for a shell, we can effectively locate the core-like groups,
whose k-shell index is unable to reflect their global importance. This makes implication to the works that use the k-shell index
9in ranking node importance.
Uncovering these core-like groups is important in identifying key players and making control strategy for spreading dynamics.
It is worth noticing that in the core-like groups, there may also exist some good spreaders. It implies that there should be
new network analysis method which will effectively locate the nodes of different importance in core-like groups in the right
hierarchical position. The new method should apply well in real networks with specific structures such as strong community
structures.
Methods
The k-shell decomposition. The algorithm starts by removing all nodes with degree k = 1. After removing all nodes with
k = 1, there may appear some nodes with only one link left. We should iteratively remove these nodes until there is no node
left with k = 1. The removed nodes are assigned with an index kS = 1 and are considered in the 1-shell. In a similar way,
nodes with degree k = 2 are iteratively removed and assigned an index kS = 2. This pruning process continues removing higher
shells until all nodes are removed. As a result, each node is assigned a kS index, and the network can be viewed as a hierarchical
structure from the innermost shell to the periphery shell.
SIR Model. The Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model is widely used for simulating the spreading process on net-
works. In the model, a node has three possible states: S (susceptible), I (infected) and R (recovered). An individual in the
susceptible state does not have the disease yet but could catch it if they come into contact with someone who does. An individual
in the infected state has the disease and can pass it to susceptible individuals. An individual in recovered state neither spread
disease nor be infected by others. In the start of a spreading process, a single node is infected, considered as seed, and all other
nodes are in susceptible states. At each time step, there are two stages. In the first stage, susceptible individuals become in-
fected with probability λ when they have contacted with an infected neighbor. In the second stage, infected nodes recover or die
(change to R state) with probability µ. Here we set µ = 1 for generality. The spreading process stops when there is no infected
node in the network. The proportion of recovered nodes defines the final infection population in a spreading process. We record
the average infected population Mi originating at node i over 100 times of the spreading process to quantify the influence of
node i in a SIR spreading.
As we take the final infected population to quantify the spreading efficiency of each node, the infection probability should be
carefully considered. If it is too large, the effect of node position is not obvious and all nodes show almost identical spreading
capabilities. If it is too small, the infection is very localized in the neighborhood, which cannot reflect the overall spreading
influence of the nodes. So we first calculate the epidemic threshold of a network using the heterogeneous mean-filed method
in Ref. [47]. That is λc = 〈k〉/(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉). Then we chose an infection probability λ > λc [14, 37], which makes the final
infected population above the critical point, M > 0, and reaches a finite but small fraction of the network size for most nodes
as spreading origins, in the range of 1%-20% [12]. In fact, we plot the infected population of a shell as an average over nodes
belong to the shell when infection probability is 1-5 times of the threshold λc, as well as the infected population when infection
probability is around the chosen infected probability λ. We find that, the relative spreading efficiency of shells is almost the
same under different infection probabilities (See Fig. S9 and S10 in SI).
Rewiring Schemes. In the first rewiring scheme, we randomly choose two edges of the network, and label the ends of the first
edge as A and B, and the ends of the second edge as C and D. Then we rewire the two edges, connecting end A and D as an
edge, and connecting end B and C as another edge. We avoid multiple edge and self-edge in the rewiring process. This rewiring
preserves the degree sequence of the original real network but destroys the degree correlations. In the second rewiring scheme,
we randomly choose an edge and test the degree of one end, record as k. A second edge with an end having degree k is then
chosen. We rewire the two edges as before and ensure that the end connecting to a node of degree k still connects to a node of
degree k after rewiring. This scheme preserves both the degree sequence and the degree-degree correlations as the original real
network.
Data Sets. The real networks studied in the paper are: (1) Router (the router level topology of the Internet, collected by
the Rocketfuel Project) [48];(2) Email-contact (Email contacts at Computer Science Department of University college Lon-
don) [12]; (3) AS (Internet at the autonomous system level) [49]; (4) Email (e-mail network of University at Rovira i Virgili,
URV) [50];(5) CA-Hep (Giant connected component of collaboration network of arxiv in high-energy physics theory) [51]; (6)
Hamster (friendships and family links between users of the website hamsterster.com) [52]; (7) PGP (an encrypted communica-
tion network) [53]; (8) Netsci (collaboration network of network scientists) [54]; (9) Astro physics (collaboration network of
astrophysics scientists) [55].
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Figure legends
Figure 1: The imprecision of kS and k as a function of p for nine real networks. The kS imprecision (black squares) and k
imprecision (red circles) are compared in each network. p is the proportion of nodes calculated, ranging from 0.003 to 0.029.
See Fig.S1 for large p plots in SI.
Figure 2: The imprecision of kS and k as a function of kS for six real networks. The kS imprecision (black squares) and
k imprecision (red circles) are compared in each network. Each square represents the kS imprecision of nodes in kS-core, and
each circle represents the k imprecision of n highest degree nodes, where n equals to the number of nodes in kS-core. kS is an
integer representing the shell index, ranging from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
Figure 3: Link strength of shells for the real networks. The link strength of each shell to its lower shells RlkS (black squares),
equal shell RekS (red circles) and upper shells RukS (blue triangles) are represented. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the
largest kS value in the network.
Figure 4: Link strength of the innermost core to each shell of the network. (a) The link strength of the innermost core to
each shell exhibits a U-shape curve in Router (black squares), Emailcontact (red circles) and AS (blue triangles) networks. (b)
The link strength of the innermost core to each shell exhibit a slope in Email (black squares), CA-Hep (red circles) and Hamster
(blue triangles) networks. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
Figure 5: Link entropy of the innermost core for the real networks and their randomized version. (a) Link entropy of the
innermost core for the real networks. (b) Link entropy of the innermost core for the degree-preserving randomized networks.
kSmax is the largest kS value in the network. HkSmax is the link entropy of the innermost core.
Figure 6: Locating core-like groups in real networks by link entropy. (a)-(c) The imprecision of kS and k as a function of
kS for three real networks. The kS imprecision(black squares) and k imprecision(red circles) are compared. Link entropy of
shells in three networks. HkS is the link entropy of kS shell. Hollow red circles outline the shells which are densely connected
core-like groups. These are 21-shell, 16-shell and 15-shell in PGP, 7-shell and 6-shell in Netsci and 48-shell and 30-shell in
Astro. kS ranges from the smallest kS value to the largest kS value in the network.
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TABLE S1. Proportion of nodes in high shells in the studied real networks. d indicates the shell ranking difference of a
shell from the highest shell. d = 0 corresponds to the highest shell, d = 1 corresponds to the nearest shell from the highest
shell. For example, the highest shell of CA-Hep is 31-shell, while the second highest shell is 23-shell. Thus, d = 0 corresponds
to 31-shell, and d = 1 correspond to 23-shell.
Network d = 0 d = 1 d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 d = 5 d = 6 d = 7 d = 8 d = 9
Router 0.52% 0.80% 1.25% 2.15% 3.25% 6.53% 85.50% 0 0 0
Emailcontact 0.33% 0.05% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.29% 0.10% 0.06% 0.26%
AS 0.31% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.06% 0.06%
Email 1.06% 9.62% 10.33% 9.80% 7.50% 8.83% 11.56% 7.33% 8.83% 11.47%
CA-Hep 0.37% 0.28% 0.24% 0.22% 0.12% 2.07% 3.62% 6.44% 10.23% 13.36%
Hamster 1.25% 4.25% 2.75% 0.70% 2.75% 1.85% 1.30% 6.25% 2.90% 3.40%
PGP 0.38% 0.02% 0.67% 0.06% 0.03% 0.02% 0.19% 0.02% 0.23% 0.01%
Netsci 2.38% 4.22% 5.54% 6.07% 26.91% 24.80% 22.96% 7.12% 0 0
Astro 0.38% 0.38% 0.35% 0.38% 0.33% 0.30% 0.28% 0.01% 0.29% 0.56%
Text S1. Explanation of the kS imprecision demonstrated in Fig. S1. In Router, the imprecision is under 0.1 at first, and
then rises at around p ≈ 0.15. As the number of nodes in 1-shell accounts for 85.5% of the network size, the rising results from
the random selection of nodes in 1-shell. In Emailcontact and AS, within in 20% of the network size, the imprecision is low. In
Fig. S1 (d)-(f) the imprecision of kS decreases with p. In Email, the core-like groups, 11-shell, accounts for 1.1% of the network
size. From 10-shell, the spreading efficiency decreases with shells. The number of nodes in 10-shell accounts for about 10% of
the network size. This results in the sharp decrease of kS impression until p ≈ 0.11. In CA-Hep, the 31-shell, 23-shell, 20-shell
and 18-shell accounts for about 1% of network size, which corresponds to the high kS imprecision for p < 0.01 (See Fig. 1 in
main text). Next to the 18-shell is the 9-shell. From the 9-shell, the spreading efficiency decreases with shells. The proportion of
nodes in shells 9, 8, 7, 6 is 0.1%, 2%, 3.6%, 6.4% respectively. Thus at p ≈ 0.13, the imprecision of kS goes to a low value. In
Hamster, the innermost 24-shell accounts for 1.25% of the network size, which corresponds to the high kS imprecision before
p = 0.0125 (See Fig. 1 in main text). Then the kS imprecision decreases with p until p ≈ 0.09, which corresponds to the high
spreading efficiency of 22-shell and 21-shell. In PGP, from the 31-shell to 22-shell, accounting for 1.4% of network size, the
spreading efficiency decrease from the inner shell to periphery shell, which corresponds to the low kS imprecision (See Fig. 1
in main text). Then from 21-shell to 11-shell, locally densely connected groups occurs. The proportion of nodes of these shells
accounts for 2.1% of the network size. Thus , at p ≈ 0.035, the kS imprecision goes down. In Netsci, core nodes accounts
for 2.4% of network size, that corresponds to the the low kS imprecision before p = 0.024. Then in shell 7 and 6 , where the
proportion of nodes are 4.2%, 5.5% respectively, locally densely connected groups occurs, which corresponds to the highest kS
imprecision at p ≈ 0.12. The proportion of nodes in 5-shell is 6.1%, and since then, the kS imprecision begins to decrease. In
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FIG. S1. The imprecision of kS and k as a function of p for nine real networks. p is the proportion of nodes calculated,
ranging from 0.02 to 0.2.
Astro, the low kS imprecision before p = 0.015 (See Fig. 1 in main text) corresponds to the 51-shell and above. The 48-shell
is a local group, accounting for 0.3% of the the network size. This corresponds to the sharp rise at p ≈ 0.015. Then the kS
imprecision goes down.
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FIG. S2. The imprecision of kS and k as a function of kS for degree-preserving randomized networks. In all the networks
shown in (a)-(f), the kS imprecision is very low, under the value of 0.07, and in most cases lower than k imprecision. For the
randomized networks of Email and Hamster, although the kS imprecision is slightly higher than that of degree in some shells,
the absolute values are very low, under 0.025. This indicates that the k-shell strategy is more effective than or at least as well as
degree in most cases.
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FIG. S3. The imprecision of kS and k as a function of kS for degree-degree correlation preserving randomized
networks. The imprecision of kS is very low in high shells and is lower than that of k.
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FIG. S4. Clustering coefficient of shells for the real networks. (a), (b), (c) The average clustering coefficient is smaller than
0.1 in the innermost core shell. (d), (e), (f) The average clustering coefficient is greater than 0.5 in the innermost core.
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FIG. S5. Link strength of shells for degree-degree correlation preserving randomized networks . The link strength of
each shell to its lower shells RlkS (black squares), equal shell RekS (red circles), and upper shells RukS (blue triangles) in the
degree-degree correlation preserving randomized networks are represented. (a), (b), (c) RlkS is much larger than RekS in high
shells. (d), (e), (f) RlkS is strongly promoted and is always larger than RekS in high shells in CA-Hep (e) and Hamster (f),
although in Email (d) there is no obvious promotion.
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FIG. S6. Link strength of the second innermost shell to each shell of the network. (a) Similar to the core, the second
innermost shell are well connected to other parts of the network in Router (black squares), Emailcontact (red circles) and AS
(blue triangles). (b) The link ratio within the second highest shell is lower than 0.6 in Email (black squares) and Hamster (blue
triangles), but is still close to 1.0 CA-Hep (red circles).
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FIG. S7. Link entropy of the innermost core for the real networks and their randomized version. (a) Link entropy of the
innermost core for the real networks. (b) Link entropy of the innermost core for the degree-degree correlation preserving
randomized networks. In all the randomized networks, the core entropy is above 0.5.
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FIG. S8. Link strength of shells for three real networks. The link strength of each shell to its lower shells RlkS (black
squares), equal shell RekS (red circles) and upper shells RukS (blue triangles) are represented. For those core-like groups,
21-shell, 16-shell and 15-shell in PGP, 7-shell and 6-shell in Netsci and 48-shell and 30-shell in Astro, RekS is much higher than
RlkS .
20
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
1 2 3 4 5
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 
 
 k
S
=7 k
S
=2
 k
S
=6  k
S
=1
 k
S
=5 avg
 k
S
=4
 k
S
=3
a Router
M  
 
k
S
=23  k
S
=10
k
S
=20  k
S
=1
k
S
=15  avg
k
S
=14
Emailcontactb
 
 
k
S
=25 k
S
=5
k
S
=20 k
S
=1
k
S
=15 avg
k
S
=10
ASc
 
 
k
S
=11  k
S
=6  avg
k
S
=10 k
S
=1
k
S
=9
k
S
=8
d
Email
 
 
 
 k
S
=31  k
S
=6
 k
S
=23 k
S
=3
k
S
=20 avg
 k
S
=18
 k
S
=9
e
CA-Hep
 
 
k
S
=24 k
S
=8 avg
k
S
=22 k
S
=1
k
S
=19 
k
S
=18
k
S
=15
f
Hamster
q c
M
M
 
 
k
S
=31  k
S
=10
k
S
=21  k
S
=2
 k
S
=16 avg
 k
S
=15
 k
S
=12
g
PGP
q c q c
 
 
k
S
=8 k
S
=3
k
S
=7 avg
k
S
=6
k
S
=5
k
S
=4
h Netsci
 
 
k
S
=56 k
S
=25 k
S
=5
k
S
=48 k
S
=19 avg
k
S
=47 k
S
=10 
k
S
=30 
k
S
=29 
k
S
=26
i
Astro
FIG. S9. Infected population of kS shells as a function of infection probability, which is q times of the epidemic
threshold λc, q ranges from 1 to 5. (a), (b), (c) In the first group, high shells are consistently reaching a higher infection
population than low shells. (d), (e), (f) In the second group, the innermost cores have a relatively low efficiency than low shells.
(g), (h), (i) In the third group, the innermost cores have the highest spreading efficiency. But there exist some shells of high kS
index that have a lower efficiency than adjacent shells. They are 21-shell, 16-shell and 15-shell in PGP, 7-shell and 6-shell in
Netsci and 48-shell and 30-shell in Astro.
21
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
 
 
 
k
S
=7 k
S
=3 avg
k
S
=6 k
S
=2
k
S
=5 k
S
=1
k
S
=4
Router
a
M  
 
 
 kS=23 kS=10
k
S
=20 k
S
=1
k
S
=15 avg
k
S
=14
Emailcontactb
 
 
 
 
k
S
=25 k
S
=10 k
S
=1 
k
S
=20 k
S
=5 avg
k
S
=15
c
AS
 
k
S
=11 k
S
=6
k
S
=10 k
S
=1
k
S
=9 k
S
=avg
k
S
=8
Emaild
 
 
k
S
=31 k
S
=9 avg
k
S
=23 k
S
=6
k
S
=20 k
S
=3
k
S
=18
e CA-Hep
 
 
k
S
=24 k
S
=8
k
S
=22 k
S
=1
k
S
=19 avg
k
S
=18
k
S
=15
f
Hamster
 
 M
M
 
 
k
S
=31 k
S
=12 avg
k
S
=21 k
S
=10
k
S
=16 k
S
=2
k
S
=15
g
PGP
q q
 
 
k
S
=8 k
S
=4
k
S
=7 k
S
=3
k
S
=6 avg
k
S
=5
h Netsci
q
 
 
k
S
=56 k
S
=29 k
S
=19 k
S
=avg
k
S
=48 k
S
=26 k
S
=10
k
S
=47 k
S
=25 k
S
=5
k
S
=30
i
Astro
FIG. S10. Infected population of kS shells as a function of infection probability, which is q times of the infected
probability λ, q ranges from 0.9 to 1.5. The relative spreading efficiency of shells is the same as the spreading when the
infection probability is around λc as shown in Figure S9.
